“Naming and shaming” is one of the oldest tools in international politics. It costs little, requires no army, and works by simple logic: states care about their reputations, and public condemnation by a group of peers imposes a reputational price that can result in tangible economic and financial costs for violator regimes. International organizations are especially suited to shame norm violators, because they condemn collectively and so carry more weight.

France’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, as is the case with other European states, has deep historical roots, underpinned by diplomatic, cultural, scientific, and economic ties. However, after the Cold War, Latin America and the Caribbean lost relative prominence in French foreign policy compared with other priorities, such as Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean, and, more recently, the Indo-Pacific.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Europe responded quickly. It condemned Moscow, imposed sweeping sanctions, and began sending arms to Kyiv. Brazil went only halfway. A democracy and in many ways a Western-facing country, it condemned the invasion at the United Nations but refused to join the sanctions or send weapons. Four years later, it still refuses.

Regionalism is redefining itself with new roles and objectives. During the 1990s and much of the 2000s, regional projects were conceived primarily as mechanisms for liberalizing trade, attracting investment, and deepening economic integration. The success of a regional initiative was measured by the growth of intraregional trade, the reduction of barriers, or the advancement of common institutions.

This article is an adapted version of the original piece published in Latinoamérica21 (L21), a media platform that brings together a diverse community of experts and scholars who offer analysis and commentary on political, economic, and social issues in Latin America. You can access the original text here. For years, the most commonly used term to describe Latin American regionalism has been “crisis.” Yet that category no longer suffices to explain its current situation. Spea

Since 1999, Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union (EU) have maintained a Bi-regional Strategic Partnership mechanism: 27 countries on the European side, 33 in the American hemisphere. While all participants adhere to the Westphalian principle of the legal equality of states, it is clear that not all of them carry the same weight in world politics, nor in decision-making within their respective regions when it comes to defining policies toward the other side o

Democracy is in trouble - not because people have stopped believing in it, but because there's a growing gap between the ideal and lived experience. Across Latin America and Europe, political language has shifted from treating opponents as rivals to treating them as enemies. Trust in institutions has collapsed, young people are disengaged, and populism is filling the void. The answer, the author argues, is collective leadership rooted in communities.

The article examines how Brazil strengthened its presence in Portuguese-speaking African countries during Lula’s administration through a strategy of autonomy based on the diversification of alliances. Through the CPLP, academic cooperation, and cultural ties, Brazil projected soft power in Africa. The text argues that these resources could be complemented by the European Union’s institutional and financial capacity to advance a common development agenda.

Critical raw materials are vital for Europe’s green transition, defence, and digital industries, yet the EU remains heavily dependent on external suppliers, especially China. Latin America—rich in lithium, copper, graphite, and other strategic minerals—has become a key partner through trade agreements and raw materials partnerships. However, reducing dependency will require not only extraction, but also local processing, industrial investment, and resilient supply chains.

Demographic shifts are reshaping care agendas across both Europe and Latin America, though through divergent paths. Europe contends with an aged population and caregiver shortages, while Latin America faces a rapid fertility collapse and eroding family-based care networks. Both regions increasingly recognize that care can no longer rest on women's unpaid labor alone. Landmark frameworks from the EU Care Strategy to the Buenos Aires Commitment and the EU-CELAC Care Pact signal

The European Green Deal, particularly the EU Regulation on deforestation-free products (EUDR), is redefining access to key markets for Colombian exports like coffee and cocoa. While it promotes sustainability through strict traceability and verification, it also risks excluding smallholders if institutions fail to provide the necessary support. The real challenge lies not in producer readiness, but in building inclusive systems that prevent widening inequalities.

After the EU–Mercosur agreement was signed in 2026, Brazil ratified it swiftly with broad support, unlike Europe. In his article, Nicolás Pose-Ferraro explains this contrast through a key shift: Brazil’s manufacturing industry moved from opposition to support. He tests standard explanations and proposes a top-down mechanism driven by persuasion, ideas, and institutional pressure during crisis.

With recent signature of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, a long process of negotiation may have a successful ending. In any case, environmental contestation in the EU might seem to threaten the entry into force of the agreement. However, when did it start and what role has it played in EU-Mercosur talks?

After more than 25 years of talks, the EU–Mercosur trade deal was agreed in early January, overcoming last-minute opposition with safeguards for EU farmers. A surprise European Parliament vote on January 21, however, sent the deal to the European Court of Justice, likely delaying ratification. Beyond trade, the blog shows how the agreement signals a shift in EU regulatory power, notably through setbacks on animal welfare standards.

This blog explores the geopolitical impact of the U.S. military operation in Venezuela and Nicolás Maduro’s capture, arguing it has not advanced democratic transition. Through the lens of peripheral realism, it shows how Latin American states and the EU largely avoided confronting Washington, prioritizing strategic and economic interests. It highlights regional fragmentation, opportunistic alignment with U.S. power, weak multilateral responses, and calls for coordinated, cond

The world is undergoing a profound geopolitical and economic reconfiguration that is reshaping foreign policy and international relations. In this emerging multipolar system—marked by interdependence and uncertainty—the EU has intensified its search for reliable partners to secure critical resources and strengthen strategic autonomy. In this context, MERCOSUR, and Argentina in particular, emerges as a key partner due to its energy resources, lithium reserves, and green hydrog

Held in Belém in November 2025, COP30 marked ten years since the Paris Agreement and the completion of its first full implementation cycle. In a context of geopolitical turbulence and weakening international cooperation, the conference reaffirmed multilateralism as a central pillar of climate governance, underscored the urgency of scaling up climate finance, and highlighted persistent challenges related to transparency, implementation, and the integration of non-state actors.

Relations between the EU and Mercosur date back decades, with the 1990s Framework Agreement enabling negotiations for an Association Agreement. Talks came close in 2004 and again in 2019, but shifting political priorities, protectionism, and later the EU Green Deal stalled progress. Relaunched in 2023–2024 amid geopolitical tensions, negotiations concluded in December 2024, though ratification faced renewed political obstacles within the EU.

Two years after the last CELAC-EU Summit, leaders met in Santa Marta in 2025 and delivered a significant outcome: the launch of a Bi-regional Pact on Care. Endorsed by all EU member states and 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries, the non-binding declaration advances care as a political priority to address structural gender inequalities. The Pact reflects sustained civil society engagement and builds on regional and global frameworks to deepen bi-regional cooperation on

The 2025 CELAC–EU Summit in Santa Marta took place amid low attendance and geopolitical turbulence, yet advanced a broader and more ambitious bi-regional agenda. Despite fragmentation within CELAC, the declaration expanded cooperation on governance, security, digital issues and care, signalling resilience in the partnership and a commitment to deepen ties ahead of the 2027 Brussels summit.