The Global Gateway and the EU’s cooperation with Latin America in a geopolitical key

In a context of changes in global governance and questioning of the international cooperation system, relations between the European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are undergoing a transformation process to adapt to the reconfiguration of the international order and to address geopolitical struggles among major powers, the trade war, and competition for strategic resources. The announcement by the Trump Administration of the United States (US) of the temporary closure of USAID, which affected 80% of its programmes in February 2025, caused shock due to its impact on numerous developing countries that suddenly saw their external support for social programmes reduced. This announcement coincides with cuts in the main development agencies of several countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. These announcements point to a crisis affecting the entire cooperation system, and among its causes are factors such as: the overlapping crises that have increased the indebtedness of many countries; doubts about the effectiveness of aid; the questioning of the modus operandi of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the Global South; the rise of South–South cooperation with different rules (including China); and pressure to increase defence spending, among others. Added to this is the evidence that the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will not be reached by the established 2030 deadline unless many more resources are mobilised from both public and private sources.

The cooperation system is changing, and the EU seeks to adapt its strategies to this more complex world through more flexible instruments. In this context, on 1 December 2021, the EU announced the launch of the Global Gateway, a global initiative aimed at mobilising up to €300 billion between 2021 and 2027 in cooperation for investments in infrastructure, as well as in the energy and digital transitions. Beyond its economic scope, the Global Gateway is an EU strategy to regain global presence and counter the growing influence of China.

The dimensions of the Global Gateway 

Global Gateway pursues several interrelated objectives, which can sometimes come into conflict. First, it seeks to promote the energy and digital transitions within the framework of the Agenda 2030 and the European Green Deal in its external dimension. Hence its five main pillars are: digitalisation; climate and energy; transport; health; and education and research. Second, it has a geoeconomic dimension whose main goal is to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and industrial recovery in the face of competition from China and the US, ensuring access to strategic raw materials. Third, in its geopolitical dimension, it seeks to make the EU’s external agenda more visible and coordinated in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Reconciling these three objectives is not easy, and there is concern that economic and geopolitical interests may prevail over development goals.

All three dimensions are present in the Global Gateway strategy for LAC, which has an allocated budget of €45 billion for the reference period. The Von der Leyen Commission has shown a tendency to prioritise competitiveness and seeks to increase its strategic autonomy, reduce dependence on China and the US, and diversify partners and markets, gaining access to natural resources needed for its energy and digital transitions. Latin America offers clear opportunities, although there is a risk of replicating extractivist logics and prioritising Europe’s strategic interests over those of LAC, especially when compared with the investment packages offered by China and the US. During Von der Leyen’s 2023 tour of the region, agreements were signed for access to raw materials, raising concerns about a deepening of extractivist practices in LAC.

The modus operandi of the Global Gateway is based on the TEAM Europe approach, a coordinated effort between the EU, its Member States—which includes ODA, assistance and export credits—international development finance institutions (such as CAF, IDB, EIB and other public sources), all articulated through public–private partnerships. This collaboration is essential because the amounts of investment are aspirational and depend on the mobilisation of the private sector and the states, and on all actors perceiving the Global Gateway as a shared opportunity.

An investment agenda that is not so new

The EU–LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda is structured around four pillars: green transition (energy, climate change, deforestation), inclusive digital transformation, human development, and health and vaccines—areas where complementarities can be identified. LAC requires policies that foster economic development and the mobilisation of private resources, generating incentives and reducing risks. It needs strategies to diversify the economy and identify high-productivity sectors, leveraging the green and digital transitions to create formal employment and improve productivity. The EU is one of the main providers of Foreign Direct Investment in the region, but the situation varies significantly between regions and countries. In Central America and the Caribbean, more dependent on development aid, ODA and the Global Europe Instrument are used more heavily. For large countries such as Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, an industrial development approach is proposed, with investments in infrastructure, finance, research, technological transfer and sustainability, pushing for mechanisms to encourage investment.

Currently, the dominant components of the Global Gateway agenda in LAC are the green and digital transitions. The green agenda has precedents dating back to the Lima Summit of 2008, where the EUROCLIMA programme was created. After the 2030 Agenda and the 2015 Paris Agreement were adopted, sustainable development became a higher priority, and the 2021–2027 Multiannual Regional Indicative Programme for LAC prioritises climate action and energy transition. EUROCLIMA+ has been integrated into Global Gateway, covering biodiversity management, urban mobility, food production, water and disaster management. Most of these programmes are not new but a continuation of previous efforts. The investment agenda also refers to investment in critical raw materials and joint value chains, seeking to ensure reliable EU access to resources and promote high social and environmental standards.

As for the digital transition, the EU–LAC Digital Alliance was launched in 2023 within the Global Gateway framework. This alliance seeks to promote a fair digital transition, tailored to LAC’s national and regional needs and agendas, addressing infrastructure and connectivity challenges, digital skills, governance and security. Key projects include Digital 4 Development, the BELLA II fibre-optic cable, the Copernicus environmental data strategy, the EU–LAC Digital Accelerator and the Green Amazon initiative. These initiatives also have a geopolitical dimension. While the US and China advance their digital infrastructure presence in the region, the EU promotes regulation based on its normative experience. Some LAC countries have adopted parts of this regulatory framework, contributing to global standardisation in data protection. However, concerns arise about whether the rigidity of EU regulation poses an obstacle to investment attraction and innovation, especially in AI.

These two examples show that, in balancing values and interests, the implementation of the Global Gateway in LAC requires finding an equilibrium: shared interests are the driving force, but it is essential not to neglect the ethical dimension and equity. To this end, civil society and the private sector must be involved, and transparency must be strengthened through a more open, inclusive and participatory relationship model, which may constitute a comparative advantage for the EU in its relations with LAC.

---

Anna Ayuso holds a Doctorate in Public International Law and a Master’s in European Studies from the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She has been a senior researcher on Latin America at CIDOB since 2002, after coordinating its International Cooperation Area and serving as research coordinator. She is an associate professor of Public International Law and a member of the AGAUR-funded “Global INTEL” research team. Ayuso also teaches at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). She serves on the editorial or advisory boards of CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, Mural Internacional, the Comillas Journal of International Relations, and América Latina Hoy.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the EULAS Network.