EU-Mercosur: Interregionalism as a Key to Strategic Survival

When we talk about the relationship between Mercosur and the European Union (EU), we are referring to one of the longest-standing experiments in interregionalism between two regional blocs quite distinct in their nature, structure, and ambitions. Since the early 1990s, Mercosur and the EU have worked to build a strategic partnership based on three key pillars: trade liberalization, political dialogue, and cooperation. The path has been far from straightforward. The relationship has been shaped—and at times strained—by persistent asymmetries of power and development, divergent trade policies, political shifts within both blocs, and the influence of external actors such as China and the United States.

Yet, despite all the obstacles, this interregional dialogue has led to some notable achievements—from institutionalized political dialogues and cooperation programs to the long-awaited conclusion of the trade chapter of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement in June 2019 and the availability of a renewed version in December 2024 .

Interregionalism is not neutral; rather, it is permeated by power struggles, strategic competition, conflicts of economic interests, and ideological differences. Elements of some mainstream approaches to international relations—neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and moderate constructivism—can be combined to offer a broader view of interregional ties. Of course, these are not the only possible analytical frameworks, but they are useful tools for capturing different dimensions of this relationship.

At the heart of the analysis is a simple idea: despite the ups and downs, material interests—especially around trade—remain at the core of the relationship between Mercosur and the EU. Meanwhile, the more ambitious goal of building a shared identity and common values seems to have lost momentum over time. But in a world marked by rising geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, the strategic function of this partnership—allowing both sides to navigate and balance the power of external actors—could become increasingly relevant.

A neorealist look

From a neorealist perspective, this partnership is not so much about shared values, but rather about strategic positioning. As global power dynamics shift, both regions are recalibrating their roles, not based on ideals or values, but on hard calculations about influence and maneuverability.

Enter China: a revisionist and illiberal power that openly challenges the rules of the international order that Europe helped to build. And so does the United States. In the 1990s, the EU's main rival in Latin America was a friend: another liberal power that played by the same rules in the international order. But under Donald Trump's presidency, it adopted a protectionist and nationalist stance, unleashing a tariff-based trade war that is shaking the global economy. Added to this are the war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, and the reconfiguration of global trade routes. These are not simply external turbulences: they are transforming strategic options on both sides of the Atlantic.

Today, Europe and Latin America—and Mercosur in particular—find themselves caught between multiple agencies pulling in very different directions. In this context, the grand ideals of shared identity may be losing ground, but the need for smart strategic alliances has never been more urgent.

Perspectives of neoliberal institutionalism

The future of interregionalism between the EU and Mercosur will largely depend on the willingness of both parties to deepen rules-based cooperation. At the heart of this logic is the long-awaited ratification and implementation of the bi-regional agreement. The idea is simple: stronger institutions and clearer rules could help both regions address common challenges—especially those high on the EU agenda, such as climate change, digital transformation, and the green transition—while also encouraging Mercosur countries to align with international norms and standards.

However, establishing closer ties with other powers, such as China, does not necessarily offer Mercosur a radically different alternative. In many ways, this relationship continues to replicate the old center-periphery logic, with China—like the EU—eager to access natural resources: a form of neo-extractivism in a new guise.

Of course, there is real potential for both regions to unite and promote common rules on the global stage. But turning that potential into reality is no easy task. The EU's regulatory push often generates resistance in Mercosur, where countries prioritize defending their autonomy and national interests. And, of course, old sticking points— such as environmental demands and agricultural trade —remain as thorny as ever.

Constructivist approach

Interregional relations are not just about trade agreements or diplomatic summits; they also serve a powerful symbolic function. From a constructivist perspective, the construction of shared identities and values—such as democracy, human rights, and sustainable development—has been the glue that holds partnerships like the EU and Mercosur together. But when those shared ideas begin to fray or come under pressure, tensions inevitably emerge. And that is precisely what appears to be happening within the EU-Mercosur framework for some time now.

It's true that, in the past, a shared set of values helped sustain the relationship. But lately, that ideological foundation has proven increasingly fragile. As an example, the political dialogue pillar of the Association Agreement—aimed at cementing shared principles and whose conclusion was announced in 2020—remains unpublished. As shared ideals lose some of their cohesiveness, despite strong rhetoric to the contrary, what gains prominence are material concerns and the inevitable dynamics of diverging priorities.

However, beyond the official positions of states, public opinion in Latin America continues to show a strong attachment to Western liberal values and to Europe itself. Many citizens in the region continue to view the EU as a global player in defending human rights, promoting peace, and strengthening democracy . This persistent soft power is something Brussels should not underestimate, as it remains one of the EU's most valuable assets in the region.

Final thoughts

In recent times, both the EU and Mercosur have struggled to adapt to the changing dynamics of global governance. This process has generated both moments of convergence and greater rapprochement, as well as episodes of divergence that have widened the gap. Nevertheless, interregionalism has endured, partly because the opportunity costs of maintaining this link are relatively low and because neither actor has shown much willingness to assume the governance costs associated with deeper and more institutionalized forms of interregional cooperation. So far, EU-Mercosur interregionalism has functioned primarily as a flexible balancing instrument, especially considering that the Association Agreement has not yet been ratified.

Despite challenges and limitations, the EU-Mercosur partnership remains relevant. Its growing role in managing external pressures and navigating shifts in the global balance of power demonstrates that interregionalism is far from a naive undertaking. On the contrary, in an increasingly fragmented and contested international order, the strategic relevance of the bi-regional partnership will likely grow, not despite this shift, but precisely because of it. The EU-Mercosur relationship—however contested or imperfect it may be—remains a key space for strategic action and cooperation, and a valuable tool for balancing and countering external forces.

This blog post develops the arguments presented in the article: Álvarez, MV (2024). Exploring Mercosur-EU interregionalism: A multifaceted analysis of its past, present and future functions and dynamics. Contemporary European Politics, 2(2), June, e12. https://doi.org/10.1002/cep4.12

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María Victoria Álvarez holds a PhD in International Relations (National University of Rosario, UNR), a Master's degree in International Integration and Cooperation (UNR and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), and a postgraduate degree in European Union Law and European Economic Studies (Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne). She is an Associate Professor and Researcher at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the UNR, holds the Jean Monnet Chair at the UNR, a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Service of the Nation of Argentina, and Director of the European Union Studies Group (UNR). She has been a visiting researcher at the Jean Monnet EU Centre of Excellence – University of Pittsburgh, Sciences Po – Paris, the Autonomous University of Madrid, the University of Zurich, and the Federal University of Paraná. Her research interests include European Union politics and institutions; Latin American regionalism, comparative regionalism, and relations between the EU and Latin America, and between the EU and Mercosur.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the EULAS Network.