BRICS and Non-Alignment: Threat or opportunity for EU-Latin America collaboration?

The recent BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro was a display both of the inherent contradictions in Latin America’s quest for non-alignment, and the opportunities that it opens up for a European Union eager to strengthen its relations with the region. In short: The EU must show its commitment to multilateralism, democracy and international law and justice in practice, not in discourses of “joint values”. That would mean, among other things, taking a stronger and more united stand on Gaza, and seriously ramping up finance for development and climate mitigation and adaptation for Latin American countries. But it would also require Latin America to resolve the current hypocrisy of a non-aligned agenda. If both parties can do that, it could facilitate a successful EU-CELAC summit in November. 

BRICS and Latin America’s Non-Alignment

“BRICS is the heir to the Non-Aligned Movement”, said Lula to BRICS-country leaders as they gathered at the summit in Rio de Janeiro in early July.  He was referring to the Non-Aligned Movement  established at the 1955 Bandung conference and its desire to remain independent from the United States as well as the Soviet Union. The forum sought to express the grievances of the recently decolonized countries, and take the lead in the creation of a new world order through the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order. While still in existence, particularly as a forum for coordinating reforms within the multilateral system, it lost relevance as the Soviet Union disappeared. Indeed, it lost relevance before that as the Non-Aligned Movement became associated more with the Soviet Union than any real non-alignment. 

The current desire to be non-aligned, is not about the USA and the Soviet Union, but about the US-China rivalry. The idea of ‘active non-alignment’ outlined by a group of Latin American intellectuals and former politicians, explicitly seeks to carve out a course based on alignment with international law and multilateralism, while not being associated with either the West or China. Similarly, India uses the term ‘multi-alignment’ about a similar idea, and the resemblance to the EU’s own idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ is striking. 

However, the increasing importance of BRICS illustrates exactly how difficult it is to navigate non-alignment in the current global political context. Not only is China – one pole from which one seeks non-alignment – a founding member and de facto leader of BRICS, but the recent expansion of the club to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates among its core members is widely seen as a Chinese move to strengthen the association with key development partners. While China supports a global development agenda and considers itself the world’s largest developing country, it cannot escape being the second largest economy and military power in the world. Moreover, while there is a debate about the impact of China’s investment and trade with the Global South, the reality is that China’s strategy is directed primarily towards serving its own development goals. As we show in a soon-to -be-published article, Chinese engagement can lead to the opposite of development due to de-industrialization and support for non-transparency (Benedicte Bull and Antulio Rosales, Chinese impact on Development in Venezuela: The Dynamics of Structural Stagnation, forthcoming in New Political Economy). 

Although Xi Jinping did not show up at the BRICS summit in Rio – a move seen by some as a de-prioritization of it and by others as a sign of the increasing future role his replacement Prime Minister Li Qiang – there are few signs that China give up its de facto leadership of BRICS in the near future. That makes a non-alignment discourse increasingly problematic.

BRICS and the Global South Agenda

The same can be said about the focus on the Global South. Brazil has pursued a clear “Global South” agenda as a G20 leader, now as the host of BRICS, and it will continue to do so as it hosts COP30 in November. Lula spent most of the time at the BRICS summit outlining a detailed agenda for how BRICS could respond to the needs of the Global South: Reform of the financial system, easier access to medicines, finance for climate adaptation and mitigation, global cooperation on taxation, to mention some. That was also the main theme of the final declaration of the BRICS summit: It mentions the Global South no less than 13 times. 

The Global South is a complicated category, as we have discussed in a recent article. The term is currently used in a variety of different ways. However, in no way is it possible to include Russia, a country without a colonial past, but with a history of imperialism and aggression towards its neighbors. Russia attempts to align with the Global South through its use of the term “the global majority”, also used by Vladimir Putin in his video-transmitted opening remarks at the Rio BRICS-summit. However, it rings increasingly hollow as Russia continues its outbound aggression. It is absurd that the final declaration of the BRICS summit includes a strong condemnation of Ukraine’s attack on Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh with loss of civilian lives, without mentioning that it occurs in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its deliberate, repeated targeting of Ukrainian civilians over the last two and a half years. According to the most recent UN report, in the last six months alone, 986 civilian Ukrainians lives have been lost, an increase of 37 percent since last year.

BRICS and Reformed Multilateralism 

A narrative that has more potential is that of BRICS as spearheading a more just multilateralism based on real adhesion to international law and the spirit rather than current practices of multilateral organizations. While it is the final declaration’s condemnation of Trump’s erratic and damaging trade war, the Israeli bombing of Iran and genocidal atrocities in Gaza that has received the most attention in international media, what occupies most space is the call for strengthening and reforming multilateralism. That includes support for, not critique of, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and not least; the UN IPCC. While the declaration outlines an advanced agenda for strengthening the New Development Bank, discussion of the  BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) initiative, BRICS Interbank Cooperation and BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative, intended to decrease the dollar dominance, there are no suggestions for toppling the current multilateral system, rather the contrary. 

This is also in line with Latin America’s priorities. At this summit, not only BRICS members, and the recently added category of BRICS partners (including Cuba and Bolivia) were invited. Brazil had also invited a number of additional countries and leaders of international organizations. Thus, the meeting counted participation of four heads of state from Latin America: Chile, Bolivia and Cuba in addition to Brazil, and Mexico’s minister of foreign affairs as well as Colombia’s ambassador to Brazil. If it is possible to speak of a Latin American agenda, it would be one that emphasizes multilateralism and the international rule of law.  

There is a lot in this agenda that would fit the European Union’s agenda well. One example is Brazil’s insistence on global tax justice that was a main topic of G20 and also features prominently in the BRICs declaration. The G20 agreement on a global wealth tax got a blow from the recent G7 agreement, which essentially kneeled to the Trump threat of retaliating with tariffs against countries that implement it. The agreement was widely seen as a defeat for Europe, who has long advocated for increased taxation, especially of US based global tech-companies. However, BRICS strongly support a stronger tax-cooperation. 

So, what keeps Europe and Latin America from forming stronger partnerships? I would argue it is mutual accusations of hypocrisy. For Europe, Latin American talk ofde-colonialization and support for multilateralism and international law cannot be considered more than lip-service, as long as there is no condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. For Latin America, no European discourse on human rights and international law can be taken seriously without stronger and more united action against Israel’s bombing and starvation of Gaza, with a death toll approaching 60,000. That would, at a minimum, mean following Spain’s initiative of a full arms embargo against Israel. This, and a serious attempt to support a real global south agenda, for example through ramping up funding for the Global Gateway, could make Europe a more credible partner than the current discourse of “joint values” allows for.

This fall, the EU and CELAC will meet in Colombia. The agenda is still under development. Resolving the worst hypocrisies on multilateralism and between the Western and the non-Western agenda would be a good start for how to move beyond a hollow discourse on joint values, and seek a real partnership in a turbulent world.

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Benedicte Bull is a Professor at the University of Oslo’s Centre for Global Sustainability. She researches elites, development, and global governance in Latin America, focusing on issues like transnational business, environmental governance, and China’s influence. She has collaborated with international institutions and served in leadership roles, including at NILAS and NorLARNet. A guest lecturer and former consultant, she has received awards including the University of Oslo’s Research Communication Prize and H.M. King Olav’s Gold Medal.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the EULAS Network.