COP30 and the Future of Global Environmental Governance
- Luciana Coube Cardoso
- 6 days ago
- 10 min read
The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30), organized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. Within the framework of the international climate regime, the UNFCCC COPs constitute central and contested forums for negotiation, review, and construction of multilateral environmental agreements. The Paris Agreement in 2015 consolidated a shift in the logic of the international climate regime, traditionally based on legally binding obligations agreed upon between sovereign states, towards a catalytic and enabling governance scheme, centered on voluntary pledges of action and systematic reviews by states and non-state actors.
The COP30 event was highly anticipated globally because it marked ten years since the Paris Agreement, signifying the first complete implementation cycle of the mechanisms established in the agreement. The first Global Stock Review (GST), which tracks collective progress and gaps in the implementation of the agreement, was completed during the UNFCCC's COP28 in Dubai, providing benchmarks and guidance to influence the third round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) scheduled for 2025. These NDCs are submitted every five years and encompass each country's efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The 2025 NDCs – often referred to as NDCs 3.0 – were presented in a context of increasing global turbulence, marked by the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, reductions in official development assistance (including resources for environmental actions), and the rise of anti-environmental populism .
Beyond this global panorama, COP30 presented an ambitious agenda, which included proposals on a just transition beyond fossil fuels, the need to expand climate finance – in support of the Baku-Belém Roadmap – to US$1.3 trillion, as well as greater transparency and emphasis on the climate adaptation agenda, among other themes. These goals were reinforced by the priorities established by the Brazilian Presidency, which included the defense of multilateralism, the connection of climate decisions with people's lives – or the COP of Implementation as it is often defined – and the acceleration of climate action through collective action. Along with the symbolic and practical weight of hosting a major environmental event in the heart of the world's largest rainforest, the Amazon, understanding how each of these elements influenced the development of COP30 helps to anticipate what the future trajectory for the architecture of global environmental governance might be.
This reading offers a general, though not exhaustive, overview of the main discussions that shaped COP30, highlighting their implications for the future of the enabling and catalytic environmental governance model established by the Paris Agreement.
Multilateralism, people-centered implementation, and collective effort.
The opening of the conference paved the way for what became, despite the challenges, one of the most celebrated achievements of COP30: the reinforcement that "in the fight against climate change, multilateralism is the way forward" (André Corrêa do Lago, 2025). In most sessions and corridors, the mantra "the Paris Agreement is alive" was repeated continuously. This narrative was mainly based on the scientific report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), according to which emissions continue to register record increases and countries remain off track to meet the NDCs, which are already insufficient globally by 2030. Even so, the report points out that global warming projections have decreased from just under 4°C in 2015 to just under 3°C currently. The document emphasizes that "although the new NDCs reveal the persistent collective inadequacy of countries' response to the climate crisis and of the COP's response to the UNFCCC decisions, it would be wrong to interpret this situation as a failure of the Paris Agreement or of multilateralism".
COP30 resulted in a final decision that not only highlighted, as usual, the critical role of multilateralism based on the values and principles of the United Nations, but also "united in celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement," strongly reaffirming its commitment to multilateralism and recognizing the global progress of the last decade. In a scenario marked by geopolitical tensions, weakening optimism regarding the benefits of international cooperation, and United Nations reform, the reiteration of multilateralism "should not be underestimated" (Hughes, 2025).
This reiteration occurs in the absence of a major environmental polluter and economic power, the United States, but with the reinforced and consolidated presence of the BRICS+ countries, particularly China and Brazil. Brazil's leading role in international relations is recognized by the country's recent presidencies of three important additional summits: the BRICS+ in 2025 , the G20 in 2024, and the Amazon Summit in 2023, which may have contributed to bringing coherence to the negotiations. Although the BRICS+ alliance has different domestic and foreign policy priorities on the climate agenda, not operating as a negotiating group in the UNFCCC process, there is a growing appetite within the group for cooperation on this issue.
The absence of the US federal government allowed, as expected, for an expanded role for subnational authorities within the same country. The mayor of Phoenix, Kate Gallego, highlighted that the US delegation of subnational authorities at the Local Leaders Forum, co-organized by the COP30 Presidency and Bloomberg Philanthropy, was one of the largest and maintained its commitment to climate action, even in the face of the new federal stance. Similarly, the governor of California, Gavin Newsom, seemed like a star in Bethlehem, signing several preliminary agreements to promote climate action at both national and subnational levels.
A complementary lens for analyzing tensions in terms of participation within the UNFCCC process is to observe the composition of actors at the conference. Figure 1 analyzes the groups of accredited actors at COP28 (Dubai), COP29 (Baku), and COP30 (Belém). An increase in the percentage of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and global climate action (a term for climate campaigns institutionally supported by the UNFCCC) is observed, compared to a decrease in the percentage of Parties (States) and International Organizations. In fact, COP30 was acclaimed for its democratic and representative aspect, which included, among other things, greater participation of indigenous groups and a peaceful demonstration with approximately 70,000 people.
Amidst celebrations of renewed multilateralism and concerns about the architecture that underpins it, as well as geopolitical tensions and the rise of anti-environmental populism at domestic levels, there is a growing concern about the quality of institutions and so-called "voluntary coalitions" (or climate clubs) that are being reformed, orchestrated, and legitimized by the catalytic governance model (now dubbed "collective effort") promoted by the Paris Agreement within the framework of global environmental governance. Some examples from COP30 help illustrate these concerns and clarify their broader implications.
Multilateral model versus climate club model
At COP30, the limitations of the consensus-based format of multilateral negotiations became particularly evident in the absence of two expected key documents: one to phase out fossil fuels and another to achieve zero deforestation. Repercussions include the announcement by Colombia and the Netherlands to co-host the first Conference on Just Transition to Fossil Fuels in April 2026 on behalf of a coalition of countries. These climate clubs often emerge as alternatives to stalled negotiations. Studies exist on how these groups can complement the Paris Agreement, supporting its implementation, raising awareness, and driving new measures within the UNFCCC. However, there is also a risk to equity and legitimacy in this process, particularly regarding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the operationalization of which may pose challenges to implementation. Therefore, their design and their capacity for integration into the multilateral framework may determine their success in driving just climate transition processes.
Integration of non-state actors
There is no doubt that non-state actors played a key role at COP30. More than 14,000 cities, provinces, and regions made commitments to climate solutions at the Local Leaders Forum, held in Rio de Janeiro as part of COP30. The Climate Protection Campaign for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), launched at COP29, has expanded to include more than 250 global companies such as IKEA and Schneider Electric, aiming to support more than 90 million SMEs in reducing their emissions. Similarly, the Adaptation and Resilience Collaboration for Financiers , a network of more than 70 philanthropic organizations, coordinated various climate adaptation responses. These are just a few examples among many others. However, it remains uncertain to what extent these initiatives and coalitions are effectively integrated into formal and informal climate governance processes, beyond the UNFCCC negotiations. For example, ICLEI, the focal point for the Local Governments and Municipal Authorities (LGMA) constituent group at the UNFCCC, stated that "by not bringing cities, states and regions to the negotiating table in a formal framework, COP30 missed the opportunity to harness the potential power of this broad implementation capacity and scale it up." Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which acts as the focal point for business and industry organizations (BINGOs) at the UNFCCC, stated that "we need more than roundtables and programs. We need a concrete action plan that integrates the core elements of the Baku and Belém Roadmap and channels capital into real projects at scale." Together, these examples illustrate a persistent disconnect between recognizing the ambitions and capabilities of non-state actors and their effective integration into the decision-making and implementation mechanisms of global environmental governance.
Accountability and transparency of the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.
The COP30 had several names. Some called it the COP of the Forest, others the COP of Implementation, and many the COP of Adaptation. The president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called it the COP of Truth. He alluded to the fact that there is widespread misinformation globally and the need to develop metrics capable of measuring real progress in addressing climate change. In this sense, as the Paris Agreement, within the framework of the UNFCCC, relies on voluntary and nationally determined contributions, and lacks robust compliance and monitoring mechanisms, the transparency of actions is central to promoting accountability. However, increased disclosure of information does not, in itself, imply higher levels of accountability. The Paris Agreement incorporates relevant transparency instruments in its framework, such as the Enhanced Transparency Framework. This received substantial attention during COP30, but still presents important gaps to be addressed, particularly within the framework of a catalytic governance model. Furthermore, the first synthesis of the biennial transparency report (BTR1) was released in 2025, presenting data from countries responsible for 69% of global emissions in 2021. In submitting the reports, Parties reported difficulties in terms of capacity, knowledge, data collection, and financial resources. Other examples demonstrate the difficulties in transparency and accountability that undermine the legitimacy of this process; for instance, only 64 NDCs were submitted on time (the number increased closer to the event date); the 117 Plans to Accelerate Solutions promoted under the COP30 Climate Action Agenda still lack clear accountability mechanisms; and the Parties' delegations also raised concerns during the closing plenary of COP30 regarding procedural and substantive aspects of transparency in the negotiations, including the adoption of global adaptation indicators.
Gaps in implementation at the final stage ("last mile")
The current environmental governance architecture does not sufficiently cover the ongoing implementation of climate action. This weakness is evidenced by a persistent disconnect between available financing mechanisms and the development of well-designed and effective projects and institutional frameworks. This dilemma becomes particularly evident in an example observed at COP30. The Tropical Forests Forever Fund (TFFF) was launched by Brazil following a process initiated at COP28 seeking to increase funding for countries that conserve their tropical forests. The Fund was well received by several environmental organizations (e.g., WWF, iCS, Conservation International, etc.) and received significant, albeit limited, financial commitments. In addition to prioritizing payment-for-performance mechanisms over the polluter-pays principle, the Fund also provides a framework that emphasizes long-term payments rather than project-based schemes. Despite the need for further analysis, this shift may indicate a certain weariness regarding the ambiguous results of many forest conservation projects, as well as a reflection of the persistent challenges in measuring the effects of environmental governance systems on conservation outcomes. In general terms, there is a tension between enthusiasm and prudence regarding the TFFF. Another example of this tension is observed in the caution expressed by civil society leaders in balancing the celebration of securing a portion of the Fund dedicated to indigenous peoples and traditional communities with concerns about equity and institutional implications. Although the TFFF is more specific to forest conservation, COP30 highlights the implementation deficit in various sectors.
Conclusion
What these examples highlight is the need for a more critical look at the quality of environmental governance institutions. Therefore, in conclusion, this includes a comprehensive overview of the next steps outlined by COP30 for the relationship between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the European Union (EU).
Significant, but not complete, compliance with the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement: In November 2025, 17 of the 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had submitted their NDCs 3.0. This number reaches 22 countries when considering the four that submitted their NDCs 2.0 in 2025, in addition to Argentina 's submission , announced but not officially listed in the UNFCCC Register of NDCs . The European Union submitted its NDC 3.0 on behalf of the bloc and its 27 member countries. During the same period, 20 of the 33 LAC and EU countries had submitted their first Biennial Transparency Reports (BRTs). Most countries that did not submit NDC and/or BRT reports are eligible as recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Joint work on just transition mechanisms: A key decision at COP30 was on the development of just energy transition mechanisms to complement the Paris Agreement. Climate justice has been a fundamental demand of LAC countries, as expressed by Bolivia's NDC 3.0 , which emphasizes how the decline in the country's fossil fuel production has contributed to increased internal socio-economic challenges. The first Conference on Just Transition to Fossil Fuels , to be held in Colombia in April 2026, could help strengthen joint work between LAC and the EU in this respect. As a reference, the Just Transition Fund is one of the important instruments of the EU Cohesion Policy 2021-2027.
Multilevel Implementation Mechanism: In November 2025, 16 LAC countries, along with the European Union as a bloc, were part of the signatory group of the Coalition for a High-Ambition Multilevel Partnership (CHAMP) . The coalition is a platform to strengthen collaboration between different levels of government on climate policy. It opens a strategic opportunity for leaders from both regions to jointly lay the foundations for this coalition. For example, the participation of the EU Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition in the Local Leaders Forum , the visit of the Mayor of Paris to the city of Abaetetuba to promote international cooperation, and the presence of the Catalan government at COP30 signal starting points and open doors for reinvigorated multilevel collaboration.
Luciana Coube Cardoso is funded by the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Foundation in the Doctoral Network "Understanding the Challenges of Latin America in the 20th Century - LAC-EU" with the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). She is a doctoral candidate in the Political and Social Sciences program at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), under the supervision of Dr. Jacint Jordana. Her research focuses on transnational networks of cities working to articulate climate action in the Amazon basin. She holds a bachelor's degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Brazil, and a master's degree in Urban Policy from Sciences Po Paris, France. Before joining IBEI-UPF, she worked in various positions at UN-Habitat and the Resilient Cities Network. Her participation in the Local Leaders Forum in Rio de Janeiro and the COP30 event in Belém was facilitated with support from CIDOB.
The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the EULAS Network.
Comments