What about Europe? The Brazilian Presidential election and foreign policy in a turbulent world
If you haven’t noticed, Brazil had the first round of its presidential election on 4th October. Challenger, and Far-Right son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, beat center-Left incumbent Lula da Silva by just under 2%, 47.03–45.16, and is now the clear favorite to become the next Brazilian President, no candidate having ever lost the Presidency after winning the first round.
Yet, the most striking thing about the first round was not so much who won it (polls had indicated this might happen) but the incredible ‘non-engagement’ of the public . Not only did we see record abstention of 21.08% in a country where voting is compulsory, but the whole campaign was marked by what Brazil expert Brian Winter called on social media ‘apathetic polarization’. Those people who were going to vote had essentially chosen sides long before the election and stuck to that side. ‘Alternative’ candidates – some from the centre-right, some from the extreme Left- barely got a look-in, the 3rd placed candidate, Augusto Cury, getting less than 3% of votes cast.
I mention these facts because they give us important clues about the domestic context in Brazil which, in turn, will have significant implications for the way the next President – whoever it may be – will lead with the world in general and the European Union in particular.
Domestically, the result, together with the high abstention rate, indicates three things: Firstly, disillusionment with the existing system. Second, confirmation of polarization. Third, the absence of an immediate crisis to get exercised about. All three have an impact on future Brazilian foreign policy. It is worth looking at each of these factors in turn.
According to a survey just before the first round of the elections, 73% of Brazilians support democracy. Yet only just over one third of Brazilians (38%) are satisfied with the way the democratic system is working for them. This dissatisfaction, according to several studies, is, among several factors, the result of a perception that the branches of the state– the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary- are not interested in helping ‘ordinary people’ but, rather, are constantly fighting amongst themselves for more power and influence. In fact, there have been real changes in the distribution of power between the three branches, with Congress gaining enormous influence over the federal budget in recent years, without increasing transparency about how and why it uses this power to allocate funds.
This, in turn, has fueled, and accelerated a longer-term trend of both political polarizations, often, though not exclusively, structured around the attitude towards particular branches of government. Noticeably, one of the defining themes of Bolsonaro Jr’s campaign has been a promise to ‘take on’ the Brazilian Supreme Court, especially over its handling of his father’s conviction for attempting a coup d’état in 2023.
Ironically, these points of friction have persisted even as the economic environment has, at first glance, been relatively benign. Brazil’s economy has grown steadily, if unspectacularly, since Lula came back into office in January 2023. By historical Brazilian standards, inflation has been relatively low, with its 2025 index of 4.26% having been the lowest on record since 2018. Yet, this has not translated into political support for the incumbent government since, individually, many Brazilians do not feel better off. Equally, several analysts have argued that this apparently benign macroeconomic environment could easily change, and drastically so, in the near future through a combination of fiscal problems at home (the Brazilian state is highly, and increasingly, indebted) and persistent international crises (wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, political instability in the United States, etc.).
Taken together, these factors will have a significant impact on the way the next President, whoever he is, conducts his foreign policy. It is, of course, true that a Bolsonaro Presidency would almost certainly make a deliberate choice to be much closer to the United States under President Trump than Lula would be. Yet, even so, Bolsonaro may not move as far in this direction as some have anticipated. For one thing, he may encounter an Administration which is far weaker in January than it is now, having potentially lost the mid-term elections and with Trump in the final stretch of his time in power (despite occasional comments about seeking an unconstitutional third term). Secondly, Bolsonaro cannot, in the short term at least, change economic and trade realities, meaning that China, and not the US, is Brazil’s main trading partner, making a complete break with the existing (trade-) order unlikely. This applies even more so to Lula
Kai E. Lehmann holds a BA in Politics (1998), an MA in European Union Politics (1999), and a PhD in International Relations (2010), all from the University of Liverpool. He is an Associate Professor (Level II) of International Relations at the University of São Paulo (USP). His research focuses on Political Science, particularly international politics, with a special emphasis on crises and the role of regional organizations in addressing them, the European Union, and regional integration.
The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the EULAS Network.
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