1 of 27: Germany’s Foreign Policy towards Latin America

Since 1999, Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union (EU) have maintained a Bi-regional Strategic Partnership mechanism: 27 countries on the European side, 33 in the American hemisphere. While all participants adhere to the Westphalian principle of the legal equality of states, it is clear that not all of them carry the same weight in world politics, nor in decision-making within their respective regions when it comes to defining policies toward the other side of the Atlantic.

The academic literature has addressed these national differences both in the dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as in specific relations of Latin American countries toward the EU. These transatlantic approaches (from one country toward another region) contribute to understanding a phenomenon of great complexity, yet specific case studies remain scarce.

This text aims to address one of those gaps: Germany’s policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, the so-called Lateinamerikapolitik. The central thesis is that this policy is structurally fragmented, and that this fragmentation is inherent to Germany’s institutional architecture, not a transient flaw. To demonstrate this, the text proposes a three-dimensional analytical model, examines the actors on each level, and concludes with a reflection on the European dimension of this policy.

Lateinamerikapolitik in the 21st century

The Lateinamerikapolitik can be understood as the segment of German foreign policy devoted to its relations with the 33 continental and island countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is not a compact bloc of actions exclusively for the region carried out by equally exclusive actors, but rather the sum of domestic actors who, within the framework of their broader work, have some task that pertains to the subcontinent. Because of this organizational feature, the same institution may handle Latin America in the same way it handles Africa; the Lateinamerikapolitik is composed and transformed, then, as its constitutive elements (people and organizations) authorized to speak and act on behalf of foreign policy evolve.

Although the concept is not formally defined by German authorities, studying it is useful for revealing the contents of the foreign policy "black box": actors, interests, and dynamics that operate in a relatively stable manner over time. This relevance is reinforced by the observation that the region has historically occupied a rather minor place on the German foreign agenda, perceived as peripheral both politically and economically. Looking back over a quarter century, it can be said that the subcontinent has lost relative importance compared with other priorities on Germany’s international agenda, and that the expectations that existed at the turn of the century did not translate into a denser or more strategic relationship.

A three-dimensional analytical proposal

To analyze this web of actors and interests, we propose a geometrically inspired model drawing on the image of superimposed chessboards, resembling a cube. The starting point is the classic Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach based on concentric circles of domestic actors: the hierarchy of those circles is preserved by transposing each level onto a board, or layer, that is stacked on top of the next. At the top level sits the executive branch; at the intermediate level, other state actors and implementing agencies; and at the bottom level, the remaining actors of national society. What the model adds relative to classic concentric-circle approaches is precisely the vertical dimension: what matters is not only who acts on each level, but also how the levels interact with one another.

The model incorporates two complementary FPA approaches. "Organizational behavior" describes how decisions are made through institutional routines that reduce complexity and make outcomes predictable, emphasizing the division of labor and hierarchies within each organization. "Bureaucratic politics," for its part, focuses on the intentions and resources of the actors, and maps the processes through which bureaucracies advance their interests and negotiate their positions. Applied to Lateinamerikapolitik, the first lets us confirm the stability of the system: over twenty-five years, the federal ministries have not undertaken major transformations in their policy toward the subcontinent and have been consistent within the sectors that fall under their remit. The second, by contrast, sheds light on the tensions between institutions seeking to maintain and expand their responsibilities, and the channels (formal and informal) they develop to influence foreign policy decisions. Applied together, both approaches make it possible to trace the dynamics that culminate in the concrete expression of policy toward Latin American countries.

The relevance of this model finds support in the literature on power and interdependence in international politics, which warns that whoever focuses on a single board in a three-dimensional game loses sight of the equally decisive vertical connections. That image captures with precision the complexity of Lateinamerikapolitik, in which multiple actors operate simultaneously on different levels and their cross-level interactions are just as decisive as those that take place within each level.

The top board: the government

At the governmental level are the Federal Chancellery and the line ministries that hold the greatest influence in the formulation and implementation of Lateinamerikapolitik. This policy has been organized around four areas: diplomacy and bilateral, regional and multilateral political dialogue, handled by the Federal Foreign Office (AA); foreign economic cooperation (Außenwirtschaftspolitik), under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs; development cooperation (Entwicklungspolitik), led by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ); and scientific and educational cooperation (Außenwissenschaftspolitik), historically guided by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). With the formation of the Merz cabinet in May 2025, this ministry was reorganized into two portfolios: education was transferred to the Federal Ministry of Education, Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, while research was placed under the new Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, a change that adds further complexity to the coordination of Außenwissenschaftspolitik toward the region. The AA, given its implementation resources abroad, tends to be involved transversally in all sectors; the Federal Chancellery, for its part, performs an increasingly hands-on coordinating function, operating as the highest-ranking executive authority above the other bureaucracies.

The distribution of these portfolios among the parties that make up governing coalitions introduces tensions that directly affect the coherence of policy toward the region. Each ministry evaluates and acts relatively autonomously in accordance with the Ressortprinzip (the constitutional principle of departmental responsibility), which has historically translated into a fragmentation of Lateinamerikapolitik. Added to this logic is the Kabinettsprinzip (the cabinet principle), which establishes that, in certain cases, decisions are taken collectively among different ministers, introducing a second layer of negotiation that can either soften or sharpen the tensions among the bureaucracies involved.

An analysis of the various governing coalitions throughout the 21st century shows that the partisan allocation of the Foreign Affairs, Development, and Economy portfolios has been decisive in explaining the periods of greater or lesser coherence in Lateinamerikapolitik. So far this century, the German government has been led by four chancellors from two different parties, and on several occasions the AA fell to the minority partner in the coalition (a situation that the FPA literature associates both with the ministry playing a more prominent role in conducting foreign policy and with a more limited margin for action due to the mechanisms of the coalition agreement and cabinet oversight). The case of the BMZ is particularly illustrative: at times regarded as a second foreign ministry given the breadth of its agenda, its leadership fell to the majority partner over four legislative terms, lending greater stability to development policy toward the region.

The middle board: other public institutions

The intermediate level groups together the public actors that feed into and implement decisions made at the governmental level: the Bundestag, with its legislative oversight mechanisms, and an ecosystem of implementing agencies specialized in the four sectors of foreign policy. In a parliamentary system like Germany’s, political parties—both in government and in opposition—play a greater role in shaping foreign policy than in presidential systems: the executive may face constraints not only from the opposition but also from its own coalition partners through parliamentary oversight mechanisms. For 21st-century Lateinamerikapolitik, however, the Bundestag has not played a decisive role in shaping policy toward the region, and its influence has been more reactive than proactive.

Economic promotion rests on the network of embassies and consulates, the Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) agency, and the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (AHK). Development cooperation is channeled through the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for technical cooperation and through the KfW development bank and its DEG mechanism for financial cooperation. Cultural and scientific policy is carried out through the Goethe Institute (GI), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH), and the German Research Foundation (DFG).

Added to these institutions are actors of a hybrid nature that illustrate a distinctive feature of the German model of foreign policy: the political foundations linked to the various parties, whose work in the region is publicly funded through the BMZ. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), the Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS), among others, maintain an ongoing dialogue with governmental, social, and academic actors in Latin America, extending the reach of German foreign policy beyond formal diplomatic channels. This feature enriches the German presence in the region, but it also multiplies the channels of influence and, with that, the potential frictions with governmental priorities.

The multiplicity of actors and their own bureaucratic logics generate coordination tensions that limit the coherence of Lateinamerikapolitik. For Latin American countries, this poses the additional challenge of identifying the appropriate German counterparts according to their own objectives: the same interest can find very different interlocutors, not always aligned, depending on the level at which dialogue is sought.

The bottom board: other German domestic actors

The bottom level groups together actors from German society who, without belonging to the state apparatus, influence the direction of foreign policy toward the region. Business associations have established channels of action toward the ministries of the top level and the agencies of the intermediate level. For Lateinamerikapolitik there are three organizations dedicated specifically to this relationship: the Lateinamerika Verein (LAV), founded in 1916 as a network of entrepreneurs that fosters economic relations with the region; the Lateinamerika-Initiative (LAI), created in 1994 to represent the interests of the banking and commercial sector with a single voice before German and Latin American authorities; and the Latin America Committee of German Business (LADW), sponsored by the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and established in 2015, which stands out not for the number of its members but for the economic weight of those who make it up. The shared goal of these groups is the deepening of free trade, and their influence on the Lateinamerikapolitik agenda has grown as economic promotion gains greater centrality in the ministries’ work.

Trade unions, led by the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB), exert informal influence on the government and formal influence through ministerial working groups, with a particular link to the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which has the mandate to promote workers’ interests and represent German trade unionism in third countries. Political parties, for their part, operate simultaneously on all three levels: as government on the top board, as parliamentary opposition on the intermediate one, and as interest organizations on this bottom level; their influence also extends through their membership in international party groupings and their links to the political foundations. There is virtually no German foreign policy decision that has not sparked a debate of positions among them, and Lateinamerikapolitik is no exception.

This level is rounded out by think-tanks, non-governmental organizations, and churches. Among the former, notable examples include the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), an advisor to the executive and parliament, and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), an advisor mainly to the AA; to a lesser extent, the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), oriented primarily toward the BMZ. Their function consists of identifying problems early, mediating interests, evaluating decisions, and building bridges between politics and society. Human rights and environmental NGOs, as well as the Catholic and Protestant churches (very active on issues of conflict, poverty, and human rights, and with their own implementing agencies at the intermediate level), project their influence over parties, parliament, and government. Taken together, this level illustrates the democratic nature of German foreign policy: a plurality of actors that enriches the debate, but which at the same time complicates coordination and can introduce contradictory pressures on decision-makers.

A look at the next dimension: Germany in the EU, the CFSP toward Latin America

Germany’s participation in the CFSP toward Latin America has followed a recognizable trajectory in the 21st century. In an initial phase, Berlin gave precedence to the Community framework in managing the bi-regional relationship, ceding greater room for action to the other European partners. Subsequently, and more markedly from the start of the second decade of the century onward, Germany reoriented its stance toward a more active assertion of its national interests within the CFSP. This trend coincided with a broader process of renationalization in European policy toward third parties, in which the breakdown of the consensus favoring Community leadership opened space for member states to put their own stamp on things. In that context, Germany promoted the EU’s rapprochement with the newly formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), backed free trade agreements as the organizing axis of bi-regional relations, and projected its priorities (commercial, scientific, and cooperation-related) from the Community platform.

The weakening of the bi-regional format, the advance of illiberalism, and the COVID-19 crisis reinforced national voices over the Community route toward the end of that same decade. The most recent and far-reaching factor has been the shift in US foreign policy since 2025, which acted as a catalyst for the conclusion of two significant agreements between the European Union and Latin America: the agreement with Mercosur, after more than two decades of negotiation, and the renewed agreement with Mexico, after ten years of revision. In both cases, Germany played a central driving role, arguing that the new geopolitical context made it essential to diversify and consolidate European commercial and political ties with the region.

Excursus: the EU-LAC Foundation

The European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC) illustrates the German dynamic within the CFSP framework: a position that does not always prevail at the policy-formulation stage, but which plays a prominent role in implementation. The Foundation arose from the bi-regional will to give the summit process a permanent institutional structure, and its trajectory reflects both the limits and the resources of German influence. Despite Germany’s initial reluctance (driven by economic considerations), the initiative moved forward until its formal announcement at the 2010 Madrid Summit. The choice of Hamburg as the seat, over Milan and Paris, was not unrelated to historical considerations: the Hanseatic city has for centuries been one of the main centers of maritime trade with Latin America, and Germany backed its candidacy with particular determination as a way of institutionally anchoring the bi-regional relationship on German soil. The Foundation began operating under German law in 2011 and in 2019 succeeded in becoming an international organization. A pattern in the CFSP is thus confirmed: Germany may not lead on formulation, but it acts decisively on implementation.

Outlook

The Lateinamerikapolitik of the 21st century obeys the logic of German domestic politics, not external demand. The three-dimensional model proposed here makes visible what approaches centered on a single actor or level tend to obscure: that German foreign policy toward Latin America is not the product of a unified strategy, but the sum of bureaucracies with their own mandates, partisan agendas, associations with sectoral interests, and even think-tanks with divergent diagnoses. That plurality is a sign of the German democratic system, but also a structural source of fragmentation.

From this vantage point, Latin America and the Caribbean face the challenge of relating to a multiple interlocutor whose coherence cannot be taken for granted. For countries in the region, identifying the right German counterparts on each of the three levels is as important as understanding the priorities declared by Germany. The current moment—a world undergoing reconfiguration—will foreseeably introduce changes in Lateinamerikapolitik. The question is what direction and scope that change will take, and how it will be coordinated with or break away from the CFSP. Finally, the reception and reaction of the subcontinent on the other side of the Atlantic remain to be explored.

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Zirahuén Villamar is an economist from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), holds a master’s degree in European Integration Studies from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, and a PhD in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin.

He has taught at the Faculty of Economics and worked as a researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Center for Sciences and Humanities (CEIICH), both at UNAM. He was director of projects at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) in Mexico, and a diplomat at the Mexican Embassy in Germany. He is currently an associate researcher at an institution in Berlin.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the EULAS Network.