France and Latin America and the Caribbean: A Foreign Policy Undergoing Selective Revitalization

France’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, as is the case with other European states, has deep historical roots, underpinned by diplomatic, cultural, scientific, and economic ties. However, after the Cold War, Latin America and the Caribbean lost relative prominence in French foreign policy compared with other priorities, such as Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean, and, more recently, the Indo-Pacific.

Despite this loss of prominence, the French presence in Latin America remained, but acquired a fragmented character: differentiated bilateral relations, development cooperation, cultural diplomacy, action through the European Union (EU), and the management of France’s territories in the Americas and the Caribbean (Guadeloupe is an overseas department and region; Martinique and French Guiana are single territorial authorities; and Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy are overseas collectivities governed by Article 74 of the French Constitution).

Official documents published between 2023 and 2026 show an attempt to correct this relative neglect. The content of the French Senate reports Réinvestir la relation France–Amérique du Sud : les cas du Brésil et du Pérou and La France en Amérique du Sud, quelles relations avec ses voisins brésilien, surinamais et guyanien? shows that Latin America had lost relative prominence on the French agenda and that there is a willingness to selectively revitalize relations with the region. These official documents attribute growing strategic relevance to the region due to competition among major powers, the energy transition, biodiversity, maritime routes, and illicit economies. Rather than an integrated Latin American strategy, what can be observed is a variable-geometry policy, selective in its partners and sectoral in its instruments.

Selective Bilateralism as the Main Avenue of Action

The bilateral dimension constitutes the clearest component of this revitalization. Brazil occupies a central position in this process due to its weight in the region, but the bilateral relationship remains constrained by divergences over the BRICS+, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, relations with China, and the EU-Mercosur agreement. At the same time, the reports identify substantive foundations for deepening cooperation: investment, the Amazon and bioeconomy, defense, scientific research, university exchanges, the fight against drug trafficking, and illegal mining. In other words, the Franco-Brazilian relationship cannot be reduced to the climate agenda; its viability depends on managing differences without abandoning concrete areas of convergence.

Mexico constitutes the second most visible case. The Plan d’action modernisé pour le Partenariat stratégique France-Mexique, published in May 2026 by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, broadens the bilateral agenda to include multilateralism, international law, feminist diplomacy, climate change, biodiversity, artificial intelligence, defense, judicial cooperation, supply chains, and the energy transition. The document reflects the willingness of both governments to consolidate the Franco-Mexican relationship as an economic and political partnership also oriented toward global governance and the defense of effective multilateralism.

This approach is beginning to extend to other states. The Senate report of June 2026, Argentine et Chili : dans un contexte de bouleversements politiques, quelles perspectives de coopération avec la France?, seeks to strengthen bilateral relations with Argentina and Chile through greater cooperation in defense, maritime security, the fight against drug trafficking, artificial intelligence, and science. It also proposes maintaining a demanding dialogue on human rights and historical memory, expanding the French institutional presence in both states, and promoting the participation of the defense industry in future strategic projects.

Based on these documents, a differentiated strategy can be discerned: Brazil and Mexico appear as interlocutors with global reach; Chile, Argentina, and Peru as partners for sectoral cooperation; and Central America as a space of growing logistical, maritime, and security importance.

France’s Territorial Presence in Latin America and the Caribbean

France is an EU member state with territories in the Americas. The region includes Guadeloupe, which retains the status of an overseas department and region, and French Guiana and Martinique, constituted as single territorial authorities; all three are governed by Article 73 of the French Constitution, which provides for the full application of national laws and regulations while allowing for adaptations in light of their particular characteristics. Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy, for their part, are overseas collectivities governed by Article 74, with their own statutes and greater degrees of autonomy. This territorial presence gives French foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean an immediate dimension linked to security, territorial integrity, development, and regional integration.

The 2025 reports La coopération et l’intégration régionales des outre-mer volet 2 : bassin océan Atlantique, Le Plateau des Guyanes, and La place des outre-mer dans la diplomatie française concur precisely in arguing that overseas departments and regions, single territorial authorities, and autonomous overseas collectivities should not be treated as peripheral territories dependent on the French government. In fact, they constitute a bridge for promoting cooperation with Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, and Caribbean states and, in this way, advancing initiatives in priority areas such as biodiversity protection and the coordination of maritime, police, judicial, and disaster-management policies.

The three reports also agree that the potential of these territories remains constrained by connectivity problems, administrative fragmentation, and insufficient coordination among the collectivities, the French state, and the European Union.

Another important development was the entry into force, on June 16, 2026, of the Accord entre la communauté des Caraïbes et le gouvernement de la République française définissant les conditions d'octroi à la Martinique du Statut de membre associé de la Communauté des Caraïbes, which made Martinique’s status as an associate member of CARICOM effective, without altering its status as part of France or transferring sovereign powers.

Senate legislative report No. 294, dated January 21, 2026, examined the bill authorizing approval of the agreement concerning France’s accession to the 1985 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of CARICOM, a necessary legal step to make Martinique’s associate-member status effective. The report presents Martinique, like France’s other territories in the Americas, as a strategic actor for strengthening France’s still limited regional presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. In this regard, this legal framework could help strengthen the regional integration of French territories and expand France’s participation in Caribbean cooperation mechanisms, particularly in the face of shared economic, social, health, climate, and security challenges. It could also open the possibility of gradually incorporating other French collectivities, including French Guiana.

The Shift Toward Security and the Short-Term Perspective

The French agenda also incorporates an increasingly visible security component. In November 2025, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs presented Latin America and the Caribbean as the first priority area of its international plan against drug trafficking. The plan, entitled Narcotrafic: éradiquer le mal à la racine, launched in November 2025, provides, in the short term, for strengthening regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime through the creation of a specialized academy, an increase in expert personnel and operational resources at embassies, a doubling of development assistance allocated to this area, and the promotion of a European sanctions regime against criminal organizations. The plan announced the signing of a first agreement with Mexico on November 7, 2025, and the priority negotiation, over the following twelve months, of new instruments with Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Saint Lucia, and Panama, as well as specific customs cooperation with Mexico.

Based on the documents examined, it can be anticipated that, between 2026 and 2028, French action will focus on four priorities: consolidating partnerships with Brazil and Mexico without seeking automatic convergence; promoting more effective integration of its territories in the Americas into regional organizations; linking development cooperation, port security, and the fight against illicit economies; and using the EU as a multiplier of influence amid competition between the United States and China.

Conclusions

This brief reflection is based on a review of bilateral, parliamentary, and security documents published between 2023 and 2026 by various French institutions. The analysis makes it possible to identify a renewed interest in strengthening France’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean through three avenues: (a) selective bilateral relations; (b) the regional projection provided by its overseas territories; and (c) the development of cooperation mechanisms to address shared challenges.

Nevertheless, the main limitation will continue to be the absence of a unified regional strategy backed by sufficient resources. France is unlikely to achieve a position of leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean; however, its consolidation as a distinctive actor can be anticipated for several reasons: it is a European state with a territorial presence in the region; it is a Western actor, although one that advocates a degree of strategic autonomy; and, finally, it possesses specific capabilities in climate diplomacy, technical cooperation, multilateralism, and regional security, in areas that, with varying degrees and nuances, occupy a priority position on the agendas of Latin American and Caribbean states.

Ultimately, as is the case with any public policy, including foreign policy, the effectiveness of this selective revitalization will not depend on the proliferation of political statements, but rather on its institutional continuity, effective coordination with France’s territories in the region, and, above all, the ability to turn the commitments undertaken into concrete, sustainable, and verifiable results.

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José Joel Peña Llanes holds a Ph.D. in Law, with a specialization in Public International Law, from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP). He also holds a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from UNAM.

A university professor with more than ten years of experience teaching undergraduate and graduate courses, he is a candidate for Mexico’s National System of Researchers. He is a member of the Mexican Association of International Studies, the Mexican Council on International Affairs, the International Studies Association, and the International Law Association, serving as secretary general of the latter’s Mexican chapter.

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the EULAS Network.